A Dirty Deal: Texas and the DOJ’s Dismantling of the Texas Dream Act
Published December 2, 2025 By Eshal Warsi
No one saw it coming.
In the 89th legislative session, there were nine separate bills intended to repeal the Texas Dream Act, a golden bulwark of Texas education for the past two decades. None passed (1). It was a show of remarkable bipartisanship restraint to ensure that undocumented students retained access to in-state, affordable college education.
Two days later, the US Department of Justice sued Texas over the Texas Dream Act in Wichita Falls, a favorable court for the Trump administration. In response, Texas wrote no briefs, filed no motions, and made no arguments. They acquiesced to the federal government’s demands in a mere six hours. (2) Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton’s decision has drawn the ire of civil rights groups like the American Civil Liberties Union who have filed a motion to intervene in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. (3)
The Fifth Circuit should find not only that the blatant collusion between the judiciary and the executive makes this suit non-justiciable, but also that it creates a dangerous precedent for courts to hear “sue-and-settle” suits which compromise the integrity of the judicial process.
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, the judiciary can only hear cases in which there is an actual controversy which arises. Among the sorts of cases which do not count as controversies are feigned and collusive cases. These non-justiciable situations arise when parties have no real disputes and are either fictitious or colluding. (4) Without a real controversy, courts allow predetermination to derail the justice system.
So, what should a court do if a case is non-justiciable? This was codified in United States v Johnson. The Court ruled that a court must move to dismiss a case where “the public interest has been placed at hazard by the amenities of parties to a suit conducted under the domination of only one of them” (5).
In this case, all signs point to premeditation between the Trump administration and Paxton administration. As the motion to intervene notes: “The United States did not even have to serve its lawsuit; Texas was ready and waiting.” In six hours, both Parties agreed to a slew of legal agreements: they acquiesced to a declaratory judgement, entered a Consent Order, and issued an order striking down the Dream Act (6). Even in the most egregious cases, suits take longer than six hours. This action being taken 48 hours after the Texas Dream Act was left intact is no coincidence either (7).
The involved parties do not deny involvement either. Instead, resorting to arguing that adversity exists because the State continued its enforcement of the Dream Act. In the same breath, however, the State argues that the enforcement of vacating the Dream Act will be left up to public universities who charge and collect those funds. So which is it? Is the State actually adverse to the federal government? Or is the federal government adverse to public universities? (8). There is no coherent answer from Attorney General Paxton because the State judiciary has engaged in a botched plot to circumvent the democratic process.
This sort of tactic is not new in the legal landscape. For years, Republican lawmakers have sounded the alarm about “sue-and-settle” lawsuits. These lawsuits occur when a federal agency accepts a lawsuit from outside advocacy groups “that effectively dictate the priorities and duties of the agency through legally-binding, court-approved settlements negotiated behind closed doors—with no participation by other affected parties or the public.” (9).
When this tactic was used to enforce environmental policy, Republicans howled about the federal government overstepping state jurisdiction. Sometimes, these cases were settled because the agency was going to lose anyways - and they certainly took longer than six hours to be adjudicated (10). But Paxton has thrown out any semblance of judicial stability.
It poses a real problem in states where opposing parties control the legislature and the attorney-generalship. Take for example, Pennsylvania where the Democrats control the House, but the Attorney General, Dave Sunday, identifies as a Republican (11). Attorney General Sunday could choose to collude with the federal government to strike down legislative decisions on abortion, gun control, and voting rights. Ultimately, Paxton’s undemocratic recipe can be replicated by judicial authorities across the nation.
Paxton’s tactic has unlocked a precarious legal future. If the Fifth Circuit of Appeals lets this sham agreement stand, they will have ushered in a future fraught with baseless lawsuits meant to further undermine our students, our education system, and our democracy.
Kramer, Chelsie. “Texas Dream Act Survives-Because Texans Showed Up,” American Immigration Council, May 30 2025, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/texas-dream-act-undocumented-students-legislation/
Klibanoff, Eleanor. “Texas’ swift surrender to DOJ on undocumented student tuition raises questions about state-federal collusion,” The Texas Tribune, June 9 2025, https://www.texastribune.org/2025/06/09/texas-doj-undocumented-tuition-courts-friendly-lawsuit-paxton/
“ACLU of Texas, Public Interest Groups Seek to Intervene in Texas Dream Act Case” ACLU Texas, June 24 2025, https://www.aclutx.org/en/press-releases/aclu-texas-public-interest-groups-seek-intervene-texas-dream-act-case
“Justiciability” Legal Information Institute, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/justiciability
United States v Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943)
“Emergecy Motion to Intervene and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof of Proposed Defendant-Intervenors La Union Del Pueblo Entero, Austin Community College, and Oscar Silva” June 24 2025, https://democracyforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/US-v.-TX-Motion-to-Intervene.pdf
Vladeck, Steve. ”Bonus 155: The Six-Hour Settlement” One First, June 5 2025, https://www.stevevladeck.com/p/bonus-155-the-six-hour-settlement
“Opening Brief of Appellants La Union Del Pueblo Entero, Austin Community College, and Oscar Silva” September 29 2025, https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/2025.09.29_5CA-Appeals-Brief.pdf
“EPAs New Regulatory Front: Regional Haze and the Takeover of State Programs” July 13 2012, https://earthjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/1207_etra_hazereport_lr.pdf
Vladeck, Steve. ”Bonus 155: The Six-Hour Settlement” One First, June 5 2025, https://www.stevevladeck.com/p/bonus-155-the-six-hour-settlement
“Party control of Pennsylvania State Government” Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_control_of_Pennsylvania_state_government