Public education in the United States has long relied on taxpayer support, with funding provided primarily by state, federal, and local governments for K-12 schools. The practice of public funding for education is well-established, with the inception of the Department of Education in 1867 (1). Still, the intersection of religion and state funding marks a long-standing constitutional debate. Religious institutions have been left out of public education funding for a long time, but recent legal shifts may come to challenge that tradition. This tension is at the center of the upcoming Supreme Court case, Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond, expected to be decided by June 2025, which questions whether publicly funded religious charter schools violate the First Amendment and its Establishment Clause (2).

In a June 2024 ruling, the Oklahoma Supreme Court did not approve of the nation’s first religious public charter school, St. Isidore of Seville Virtual Catholic School, stating that it would lead to unconstitutional government funding and endorsement of religion (3). Recent Supreme Court cases such as Carson v. Makin (2022) have allowed for religious institutions to access public funding, narrowing the line of separation between church and state and ultimately violating the Free Exercise Clause (4). The outcome of this upcoming hearing could greatly impact publicly funded education and the extent of religious involvement within it.

The constitutional debate surrounding Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board v. Drummond focuses on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which forbids government actions that endorse or advance religion (5). This principle has been long-standing in American constitutional law, especially in public education, where courts have been sensitive about avoiding state-sponsored discrimination.

Historically, Emerson v. Board of Education (1947) solidified this interpretation, stating that supporting religious education cannot be helped by public funding (6). However, recent rulings have gradually deteriorated this strict separation. In Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer (2017), the Court ruled that organizations with religious ties could not be excluded on the sole basis of religious identity (7). This shift continued with Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue (2020), where the Court affirmed that states would not be able to bar religious schools from generally accessible public programs (8). In 2022, Carson served as the most recent example of this narrowed distinction between religious institutions and public funding. These historical decisions signal an all-around trend of expanding religious liberties, suggesting that perhaps the Court may be willing to push existing boundaries for religious education even further in this case as well.

At the crux of the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board case lies the question of whether public funding for a religious charter school violates the Establishment Clause, or whether restricting such funding infringes on rights listed in the Free Exercise Clause. The Court must navigate this constitutional dispute, balancing the state’s commitment to remain religiously neutral with the school’s claim of religious liberty. Opponents argue that utilizing public funds for St. Isidore would result in unconstitutional government endorsement of religion, as the school would integrate Catholic doctrine into its curriculum while allocating taxpayer dollars for the cause. This circumstance differs from past cases like Carson v. Makin, where public funding supported private religious schools instead of charter schools considered to be part of the public education system. Proponents, however, assert that excluding religious charter schools is an act of discrimination, referring to the Court’s recent trend of favoring religious access to public funding and benefits (9).

The Court could pursue a wide range of outcomes that, rather than simply affirming or rejecting the school, could go on to redefine previous boundaries in the Constitution. A narrow ruling might allow religious charter schools, but severely limit religious instruction. It could also create a distinction between traditional private schools and charter schools, which would preserve their identities as public institutions, thus prohibiting them from incorporating religious practices (10). Pursuing these middle-ground options may allow the Court to avoid a sweeping ruling while still addressing the primary constitutional questions that exist.

In evaluating the outcome, several legal ambiguities and interpretive differences among the justices may prove conclusive. One central tension is the hybrid nature of charter schools. Although charter schools are publicly funded and regulated, they often operate with significant autonomy. This obscures the difference between public and private institutions, making it unclear whether St. Isidore should be treated like the private religious schools in Espinoza and Carson, or as a public entity constitutionally barred from religious affiliation. The Court must decide whether allowing religious charter schools to operate with public funding is simply treating them neutrally or if it crosses the line into government endorsement of religion. Some justices may view the exclusion of religious charter schools as a violation of Free Exercise Rights, while others may argue that inclusion would violate the Establishment Clause.

Chief Justice Roberts, who emphasized a neutrality principle in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue by stating that religious status alone could not disqualify a school from public funding, may favor a narrow ruling that allows for limited religious expression without full endorsement (11). Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, both of whom dissented in Carson v. Makin and warned that public funding of religious education undermines the separation of church and state, may stress the importance of keeping public education separate from religion (12)(13).

On the other hand, Justices Gorsuch or Thomas, who have argued in cases like American Legion v. American Humanist Association that the Establishment Clause should be interpreted with greater historical flexibility, may use this case to argue that the Establishment Clause has been interpreted too strictly in the past (14)(15). These differing judicial philosophies will likely shape the outcome and demonstrate the difficulty in applying precedent to a case like this one.

The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Oklahoma Statewide Charter School Board case has the potential to reshape the legal landscape of public education and religious liberty. A conclusion favoring the religious charter school could open the door for across-the-board public funding of religious institutions, not just in education, but in other public services as well. This would dilute the historical interpretation of the constitutional Establishment Clause and could obscure the lines between state and religious influence in the lives of the general public.

Conversely, if the Court upholds the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s June decision, it would strengthen the traditional boundary between church and state, maintaining the principle that public funding should not sponsor religious instruction. Either outcome will have lasting consequences, influencing future legal battles over religious liberty and public funding while also shaping state policies. It could also expand legal challenges beyond education into areas like healthcare and social services, including disputes over public funding for religious hospitals, faith-based foster care agencies, and other publicly funded social services.

As the Court prepares to rule, it should avoid letting the expansion of Free Exercise rights undermine the core safeguards of the Establishment Clause. Maintaining a clear boundary between public institutions and religious instruction remains essential to protecting both government neutrality and long-term religious freedom.