Rewriting the Rules: Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard and the Inconsistencies in the Court’s Affirmative Action Precedent
Published November 13, 2025 By Jade Tsang
Before Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, John F. Kennedy had already begun taking steps to end discrimination through executive orders. Executive Order 10925, signed in 1961, included a provision to “take affirmative action to ensure … employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin” (1). The intention behind these orders and subsequent laws was to ensure that all qualified individuals were granted the same opportunities. While originally meant for non-discrimination in employment, the term “affirmative action” soon evolved to include areas like college admissions. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was written to cover multiple fields including both employment and education. For the Supreme Court to do its job of judicial review properly, it must uniformly apply and interpret all parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Failure to do so risks overreaching its power and makes it difficult for lower courts to rule in a manner that aligns with Supreme Court decisions.
The idea of affirmative action in college admissions was first legally challenged in the 1978 case of University of California v. Bakke. In this case, a white applicant sued UC Davis Medical School after getting rejected, claiming their special admissions program, which reserved seats for minorities, was an unconstitutional racial quota. Since race was not the single deciding factor for admissions through the special program, the court ruled that race may be considered as one factor in admission if the university has an interest in promoting diversity in education, but must be done by narrowly tailored and individualized means (2). This decision has since been reversed in the 6 – 3 Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) v. Harvard (2023) ruling, deeming affirmative action to be unconstitutional, as it used race as a factor in college admissions, without satisfying the requirements for doing so, such as a lack of a sufficiently compelling rationale (3). The ruling in SFFA v. Harvard sets a new precedent that race cannot be used as a consideration for a goal such as diversity, as doing so is now a violation of Title VI.
The issue in question in SFFA v. Harvard is whether the use of race in the admissions process is legal or not under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI states:
“No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” (4).
While Harvard may be a private university, it still uses funding from the federal government, meaning it is subject to the laws under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A key factor the court examined in SFFA v. Harvard was the consistent proportions of each racial group in the admitted class each year, which suggested a fixed, quota-like method of pursuing racial balance rather than simply considering race as one of many factors. Although affirmative action is intended to help underrepresented minority groups, the majority ruled that affirmative action violates the explicit wording of Title VI, which prohibits discrimination "on the ground of race, color, or national origin." As stated by Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. in the majority opinion, "Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it." The Court concluded that the positive intentions behind Harvard’s process still went against the language and purpose of Title VI, especially since universities “may not operate their admissions programs on the belief that minority students always... have something meaningful to say because of their race.”
Now that any use of race has been deemed unconstitutional under Title VI, we must review cases where the use of race was allowed under any part of The Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII is similar to Title VI, but is meant for employment instead. In the 1979 case of United Steelworkers v. Weber, there was no relevant precedent, so the court could rely only on the language of Title VII itself. The United Steelworkers union had created a plan that reserved 50% of the spots in a training program for Black employees to rectify a historical racial imbalance in the skilled workforce. Brian Weber, a white employee who was denied entry to the program despite having more seniority than some admitted Black employees, sued, arguing the racial quota violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (5). In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that not all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans are to be prohibited. However, Title VII prohibits employers from taking any action that deprives an individual of job opportunities based on race, color, national origin, etc. (6). The court decided that because the purpose behind Title VII was to open opportunities for Black people that they did not have before, but the language of the law is clear; no practices that will “deprive any individual of employment opportunities” are lawful, no matter the race, color, sex, or national origin of the person. With this ruling, the court went beyond what the language of the law, according to the majority opinion, “interpretation… that forbids all race-conscious affirmative action… must be rejected.” The ruling in SFFA v. Harvard directly contradicts this prior decision since the use of race for any reason has now been found to be discriminatory, whereas it was allowed in United Steelworkers v. Weber since it was to address previous racial imbalances.
The cases of SFFA v. Harvard and United Steelworkers v. Weber show an inconsistency in rulings from the Supreme Court. By picking and choosing which cases to literally interpret the law and which cases to assume and follow the intention of the law, the Supreme Court is over-exerting its power of judicial review. For the Supreme Court to decide the intentions of the law and use it in ruling in one case, but using the literal meaning of the law in another case, they are almost rewriting the laws themselves, a power reserved only for the legislative branch. Although education and employment fall under separate titles, the interpretation and application of both should be uniform across the country. Allowing race to be a factor of consideration in one category and not the other causes discourse in Supreme Court interpretations. The conflicting rulings in SFFA v. Harvard and United Steelworkers v. Weber ultimately undermines the power of legislation if interpretations of similar laws can vary so much. Moving forward, the conflicting precedent may lead to lower courts being unsure how to rule, which may eventually lead to chaos in the court system.
UCI. n.d. “A Brief History of Affirmative Action | OEOD | UCI.” Www.oeod.uci.edu. Accessed November 5, 2025. https://www.oeod.uci.edu/policies/aa_history.php.
Justia. “Regents of Univ. Of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).” Justia Law. Accessed November 12, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/265/.
Oyez. 2022. “Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College.” Oyez. October 31, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/20-1199.
Civil Rights Act. 1964a. Vol. Title VI. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/civil-rights-act.
Justia Law. “Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).” Justia Law. Accessed November 12, 2025. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/443/193/.
Civil Rights Act. 1964b. Vol. Title VII. https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/civil-rights-act.