Spectacle on-Demand? Examining the Implications of Public Broadcasting Military Executions


By Ariana Castañeda

Published November 19, 2026

On November 5, 2009, United States Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan shot and killed 13 people and injured 32 others at Fort Hood, a military base in Killeen, Texas (1). On December 3, 2026, Hasan is scheduled to face the death penalty by firing squad, marking the first military firing-squad execution since World War II (2)(3). Initially, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the execution would be livestreamed, effectively making the government’s execution of a prisoner accessible to a public audience (4). Although President Trump canceled plans to livestream the execution on October 15, 2026, the proposal to broadcast the execution raised questions about the scope of executive authority over military executions and the constitutional limitations governing their administration (5). Its cancellation does not resolve the legal questions raised by the proposal, particularly those concerning the relationship between military execution procedures, the Eighth Amendment, and the government’s authority to determine the manner in which capital punishment is carried out. 

The use of a firing squad in Hasan’s execution introduces a separate set of considerations as it pertains to historical precedent in military executions. The last U.S. military execution by firing squad was in 1945, when Army Private Eddie Slovik was executed for desertion in France during WWII (6). Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the constitutionality of capital punishment, it has also maintained that the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that violate contemporary standards of decency (7). In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Court invalidated existing capital sentencing schemes because of their arbitrary and inconsistent application that violated the Eighth Amendment (8). Four years later, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), upheld revised capital sentencing procedures designed to address those constitutional deficiencies (9). Together, these decisions established that the constitutionality of capital punishment depends not only on the severity of the underlying offense, but also on the procedures through which the state imposes and carries out a death sentence.

There are also significant questions to consider that the proposed broadcast raises in the administration of military executions. Army Regulation 190-55, which governs military execution procedures, establishes specific restrictions on who may witness an execution. Paragraph 2-5(b) explicitly offers that “no person under the age of 18 shall witness an execution” (10). Although the regulation does not explicitly address livestreaming, its age restriction does not take into account whether making an execution publicly accessible could circumvent protections intended to limit exposure to the event. Unlike an in-person witness list, a livestream potentially allows individuals whose identities and ages have not been verified to view the execution. Whether this provision would independently prohibit a livestream would require judicial interpretation, but the possibility illustrates the legal complications that accompany expanding access to executions beyond the designated witnesses. Accordingly, whether a livestream would violate the regulation would depend on its interpretation and the Army’s authority to modify, waive, or otherwise administer the existing requirements. 

Additionally, Hasan also retains the ability to pursue federal habeas corpus relief. Although the Supreme Court declined to review his court-martial conviction in March 2025 collateral review through the civilian federal courts remains a potential avenue for challenging the legality of his detention and execution (11). Under 28 USC 2241, military prisoners may seek habeas corpus review in certain circumstances (12). Such proceedings could raise constitutional challenges to the execution method or procedures surrounding the sentence. Hasan may therefore be able to seek review in federal district court, where he can challenge the constitutionality of the execution process, and request a stay pending judicial review (13). Such proceedings would not necessarily guarantee relief or establish that his sentence is unconstitutional. They do, however, demonstrate that the completion of military appellate review does not eliminate the federal judiciary’s potential role in examining constitutional challenges to a military death sentence. 

The proposed livestream of Hasan’s execution exacerbated the concerns surrounding questions of the fundamental role the death penalty plays in a contemporary context. An execution by the state is already an extraordinary exercise in governmental power, and livestreaming it could transform an alleged tool of justice into a public spectacle. Hegseth’s proposal, which the administration initially defended as a means of demonstrating how the “United States deals with terrorists” suggests that an execution could serve purposes beyond carrying out a criminal sentence. It could become a political message, a public spectacle, or an opportunity for the government, more specifically the political party in power, to carry out its authority over the condemned (14). Even though the livestream was ultimately canceled after public outrage, the fact that the proposal was seriously considered establishes a precedent that should not be dismissed (15). Future administrations could revisit this proposal in the foreseeable future, invoking transparency, deterrence, or public accountability as justification for its implementation. This possibility underscores the precedent established by simply proposing such a measure. This suggestion could become an acceptable and normal suggestion, or even necessary component of federal execution policy. 

President Trump’s reversal on October 15 prevented the proposed broadcast from becoming an implemented government policy. Consequently, the announcement does not establish binding judicial precedent or a new rule of military execution procedure. Its significance instead lies in the institutional question it exposes: whether an executive administration may treat the public broadcasting of an execution as an available extension of its authority to carry out a death sentence. Future administrations could revisit the proposal under arguments concerning transparency or public accountability. If adopted, such a policy would require consideration of existing military regulations and the constitutional limitations governing the administration of capital punishment. The fact that the proposal was publicly advanced by the Secretary of Defense before being withdrawn by the President makes this more than just a hypothetical by the administration, but a legitimate question of government authority as it pertains to criminal sentencing in this country. If public broadcasting enters as a rule in the realm of federal execution policy, then that leaves unresolved legal boundaries that would govern its implementation, exceptions, and standards. 


  1. Office of the Press Secretary, “Public Summary of the Inventory of Files Related to Fort Hood Shooting,” January 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/public-summary-inventory-files-related-fort-hood-shooting

  2. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army Sets Execution Date for Convicted Murderer Nidal Hasan,“ October 2026, https://www.army.mil/article/295989/army_sets_execution_date_for_convicted_murderer_nidal_hasan

  3. Allen Frazier, “Death by Firing Squad: Eddie Slovik Became the Only U.S. Soldier Executed for Desertion in WWII,” Military.com, December 2025, https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/12/05/death-firing-squad-eddie-slovik-became-only-us-soldier-executed-desertion-wwii.html

  4. Konstantin Toropin, Associated Press, “Pentagon says firing squad execution of Fort Hood shooter will be livestreamed,” PBS News, October 2026 https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/pentagon-says-firing-squad-execution-of-fort-hood-shooter-will-be-livestreamed

  5. Haley Bedard, “President Trump Announces the Military Will Not Publicly Livestream Nidal Hasan’s Execution,” Death Penalty Information Center, October 2026 https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/president-trump-announces-the-military-will-not-publicly-livestream-nidal-hasans-execution

  6. Allen Frazier, “Death by Firing Squad: Eddie Slovik Became the Only U.S. Soldier Executed for Desertion in WWII,” Military.com, December 2025, https://www.military.com/daily-news/investigations-and-features/2025/12/05/death-firing-squad-eddie-slovik-became-only-us-soldier-executed-desertion-wwii.html

  7. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)

  8. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)

  9. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976)

  10.  U.S. Department of the Army, Corrections System Procedures for Military Executions, 190-55 Witnesses (Department of the Army 2023) 2-5(b), https://federallibrary.us/HQDA/AR/190-55/CURRENT/PDF.pdf

  11. Emily Hilley-Sierzchula, “U.S. Supreme Court denies petition filed by Nidal Hasan, infamous Fort Hood mass murderer,” The Killeen Daily Herald, April 2025, https://kdhnews.com/military/u-s-supreme-court-denies-petition-filed-by-nidal-hasan-infamous-fort-hood-mass-murderer/article_7913088b-71d9-4d52-bc66-381d49240ea4.html

  12. U.S. Department of Justice, “9-37.000 - Federal Habeas Corpus,” United States Attorneys’ Manual, November 2026, https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/archives/usam-9-37000-federal-habeas-corpus

  13. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3) (1964) https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/uscode/uscode1964-00702/uscode1964-007028153/uscode1964-007028153.pdf

  14. Nardine Saad, Madeline Halpert and Ione Wells, “Trump calls off livestream of Fort Hood attacker's execution by firing squad,” BBC News, October 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crx23qlnj27qo

  15. Odette Yousef and Steve Inskeep, “Trump cancels public execution, but a line may already have been crossed,” NPR, October 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/10/16/nx-s1-6003852/public-execution-stopped